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1. Introduction 
 Tax policy advisers often counsel the governments of developing countries 
against using investment incentives under their income taxes.1  A wide variety of 
arguments have been offered in support of this position.  Investment tax incentives can be 
costly in revenue terms, generating relatively little new investment per dollar of revenue 
cost and requiring increases in other distortionary taxes; this is especially problematic if 
the incentives are general (untargeted), so that they benefit a great deal of inframarginal 
investments, including those that generate significant economic rents.  Non-uniform 
investment incentives that apply only to certain types of capital assets or firms and thus 
only to certain business sectors may inefficiently distort the allocation of productive 
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1   For reviews of the arguments for and against the use of investment incentives, see Hulten and Klayman 
(1988), Boadway and Shah (1995) and Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002). 
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resources.  Moreover, the econometric evidence on the effectiveness of investment 
incentives in attracting investment is mixed. The current consensus appears to be that, 
holding other factors constant, investment does in fact respond positively to reductions in 
the cost of capital, such as those associated with tax incentives (Cummins, Hassett and 
Hubbard, 1997; Hassett and Hubbard, 1997).  In particular, in their reviews of empirical 
studies of the effects on taxes on foreign direct investment, Gordon and Hines (2002) and 
deMooij and Ederveen (2001) conclude that the empirical evidence suggests an elasticity 
of aggregate foreign direct investment with respect to effective host country tax rates of 
roughly 0.6-0.7 in absolute value, with the most recent research characterized by 
substantially larger elasticities. Nevertheless, other observers argue that macroeconomic 
factors are by far the primary determinant of investment and that tax factors such as 
investment incentives play a relatively minor role (Chirinko, 1987), with investment 
much less sensitive to cost of capital factors than suggested above  (Chirinko, Fazzari and 
Meyer, 1999).    
 Another problem is that investment incentives — especially those that are 
targeted to minimize revenue cost — can be difficult to administer, as the tax authorities 
must inevitably draw fine lines in determining which investments meet the specified 
criteria.  Such targeted incentives also create the potential for corruption and for the 
waste of resources in the form of rent-seeking behavior.  Under many incentive schemes, 
tax administrators must also devote resources to ensuring that firms do not use incentives 
to facilitate tax avoidance and evasion – e.g., using transfer pricing between related or 
unrelated firms to shift revenues to a tax-favored activity or entity and deductible costs to 
fully taxed activities or entities. 
 Effective tax incentive schemes can be difficult to design and not especially 
transparent, again especially if they are highly targeted and/or apply only to incremental 
investment.  For example, it may be difficult to determine the stimulative effects of an 
incremental investment credit that applies only to investment in excess of, say, an 
average of investment over the previous three years, because current investment will raise 
average investment in future years and thus lower future credits (Eisner, Albert and 
Sullivan, 1984).  Similarly, the stimulative effects of tax holidays that do not provide for 
carryforward of depreciation deductions that would normally be taken during the tax 
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holiday period may be relatively small; indeed, tax holidays can actually increase the cost 
of capital for longer-lived investments that are subject to sufficiently front-loaded 
deductions for depreciation and other investment allowances (Mintz, 1995). 
 Finally, in the developing country context, the effects of investment incentives on 
the cost of capital may be muted for firms based in countries, such as the United States, 
that tax their multinationals on a residence basis, subject to a foreign tax credit for taxes 
paid abroad.2  In the limiting case in which foreign tax credits are granted 
contemporaneously and used immediately in the home country, reductions in the 
effective tax rate in the host country have no effect on investment since any taxes 
foregone in the host country are fully offset with home country taxes – the so-called 
“Treasury transfer” effect.  The importance of this effect, however, is quite limited in 
many cases.  Many capital-exporting countries tax their multinationals on a “territorial” 
basis and thus impose no home country tax on foreign source earnings, or have entered 
into treaties that allow “tax sparing” under which fictitious foreign tax credits offset the 
home country tax liability that would otherwise arise when the host country offers 
investment incentives.  Moreover, given existing home country limitations on the use of 
foreign tax credits, many multinationals already have more foreign tax credits than they 
can use (they are in an “excess foreign tax credit position”), so that host country tax 
incentives are beneficial since host country taxes are reduced while home country taxes 
are offset using the existing stock of foreign tax credits.  Finally, the Treasury transfer 
argument assumes equal and contemporaneous host country taxes and home country 
credits.  In actuality, the present value of host country taxes, which are paid 
contemporaneously, typically exceeds the present value of home country tax credits, 
which are deferred until earnings are repatriated to the parent company. Indeed, under 
certain circumstances, the home country repatriation tax is irrelevant to investments 
financed with the retained earnings of the subsidiary, which are affected only by the host 
country tax (Hartman, 1985).  Although the net effect of all these factors will depend on 
the specific circumstances in a country, these qualifications suggest that in many if not 
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most cases the possibility of foregoing a treasury transfer effect does not constitute an 
important argument against the use of tax incentives (Gordon and Hines, 2002). 
 In any case, despite the various arguments against their use, investment tax 
incentives are widespread in developing countries.  Some of this may simply be 
attributable to the fact that politicians face tremendous pressure to increase investment 
and create jobs, and tax incentives are a highly visible and relatively flexible means of 
concrete action toward achieving these goals, regardless of their effectiveness.  However, 
a wide variety of more substantive arguments, with different degrees of validity, have 
been offered in support of the use of investment tax incentives.  
 For example, within the context of an income tax, the standard argument for 
uniform treatment of all types of business assets and all business sectors (and thus against 
the use of (non-uniform) investment incentives) hinges on a number of assumptions that 
are unlikely to be fully satisfied in practice.  The case for uniformity is strongest within 
the context of a dynamic model in which labor is taxed optimally over time; if these 
conditions are not obtained, differential taxation of capital inputs can be desirable 
(Auerbach, 1989), similar to the exceptions that arise to the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) 
production efficiency theorem (which precludes taxation of production inputs) when all 
commodity taxes are not available or not set optimally.  Similarly, uniformity requires 
perfect competition; otherwise, differential taxation designed to offset the effects of 
market imperfections and capture economic rents — especially those attributable to 
foreign owners of capital — will be desirable.  However, the likelihood that investment 
incentives could and would be designed to accurately correct for these market 
imperfections may be small. Given the administrative convenience of uniform rates and 
the likelihood that any tax differentials enacted will reflect political power rather than 
optimal tax considerations, the case for using investment incentives to introduce the tax 
differentials required by optimal taxation must be applied with great caution. 
 Externalities also potentially provide a rationale for differential capital income 
taxation.  In many cases, such as the generation of pollution, externalities are negative so 
that, in the absence of the appropriate effluent fees, properly designed investment 
incentives could encourage activities that do not generate negative externalities. 
Alternatively, some activities, such as investment in research and development, may 
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generate positive externalities, which would be underprovided in the absence of 
investment incentives.  These arguments provide a rationale for highly targeted incentives 
that attempt to correct for the externality, but do not support general tax incentives or 
targeted incentives that are not explicitly tied to the generation of externalities.3 
 Another rationale for investment incentives that is often cited in the developing 
world is the need to attract highly mobile international capital to increase the returns to 
local factors and stimulate growth and technological innovation.  The basic line of 
reasoning is as follows.  As is well known (Gordon, 1986; Sadka and Razin, 1991), a 
country that faces a perfectly elastic supply of internationally mobile capital should avoid 
using source-based taxes on capital income.  In the long run, imposing such a tax will 
merely drive capital out of the taxing country until the after-tax rate of return returns to 
the internationally determined level. This migration of capital lowers the productivity of 
the factors in the taxing jurisdiction that are immobile – land and labor that is relatively 
immobile.  As a result, local factors bear not only the entire burden of the tax but also its 
“excess burden”  – the efficiency cost imposed by the tax-induced out-migration of 
capital from the taxing jurisdiction.   
 This efficiency cost or excess burden of taxing mobile capital arises from three 
sources.  First, as noted above, the tax-induced capital outflow lowers the productivity of 
local factors.  Second, use of the capital income tax creates a tax bias favoring production 
of labor-intensive goods; this effect arises because the tax-induced reduction in wages 
that occurs as the capital income tax is shifted to labor is less pronounced for goods with 
a relatively large labor income share, causing an inefficient reallocation of labor to the 
labor-intensive sector (Gordon and Hines, 2002).  Third, as stressed in the tax 
competition literature (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1986), governmental 
                                                 
3  Investment incentives are also often advocated on macroeconomic grounds as a means of providing 
short-run stimulus to an economy that is suffering from excessive unemployment or inadequate growth.  
The validity of the case for incentives on these grounds depends on the reasons for unemployment or 
inadequate growth.  However, the effectiveness of investment incentives in stimulating an economy that is 
already at excess capacity, as well as the ability of governments to time the use of investment incentives to 
effectively offset cyclical factors, is open to serious question.  The current consensus seems to favor the use 
of monetary policy over the use of fiscal policy (such as changes in investment incentives) as a stabilization 
tool.  Yet another rationale for investment incentives arises if economies of scale are important in the 
production of tradable goods, so that investment incentives will increase the scale of operation of local 
firms, lower their costs, and increase their competitiveness on imperfectly competitive international 
markets. 
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concern about the negative effects of taxing mobile capital may lead to under-provision 
of public services.4  These factors imply that, from the viewpoint of the taxing 
jurisdiction, it is preferable simply to tax the local factors directly, and thus avoid at least 
the excess burden of the tax on mobile capital. 
 On the other hand, not all capital is perfectly mobile, at least not in the medium 
term that is likely to be the focus of most governments.  For example, some capital may 
earn location-specific rents and, once capital is in place, adjustment costs for moving 
capital in response to a tax increase may preclude either rapid or any adjustment.  Under 
these circumstances (and abstracting from anticipation effects on future capital 
accumulation), some source-based taxation of such imperfectly mobile may be desirable, 
especially if some of this imperfectly mobile capital is owned by foreigners so that the 
tax burden can be exported.  Moreover, some form of taxation of business capital is 
necessary as a backstop to the individual income tax.  Otherwise, individuals could 
incorporate as businesses in order to defer paying tax on their labor income, perhaps 
indefinitely if income can be withdrawn from the corporation as capital gains that are tax 
exempt or taxed very lightly (Gordon and Mackie-Mason, 1995).  Taxation of domestic 
capital income at rates approximating those applied to labor income is desirable to limit 
this form of tax avoidance. In addition, taxation of foreign source corporate income at the 
same nominal tax rate as that applied to domestic corporate income is likely to be a 
political necessity, and may even be constitutionally required.    
 This discussion suggests that the problem of capital income taxation facing a 
developing country that utilizes an income tax can be loosely outlined as follows.  
Concerns about tax avoidance and the desire to appropriate some economic rents from 
imperfectly mobile capital (especially if it is foreign owned), perhaps coupled with the 
political necessity of creating at least the appearance of taxing internationally mobile 
capital, require that a uniform tax rate be applied to all capital income.  However, the 
small open economy argument outlined above, including the tendency for under-
provision of critical public services due to concerns about the economic effects of taxing 
                                                 
4   Of course, tax competition has many other effects, some of which are also efficiency reducing and others 
that are efficiency enhancing (Wilson, 1999; Zodrow, 2003a).   Nevertheless, a central message of this 
literature is that to the extent that capital is internationally mobile, tax competition puts downward pressure 
on both capital income tax rates and the public services financed with the associated revenues. 
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highly mobile capital, suggests that source-based taxation of internationally mobile 
capital should be reduced or eliminated, a result that can be achieved in the context of 
uniform rates by providing only such highly mobile capital with the appropriate 
investment incentives.  This is the approach analyzed in this paper, which builds on 
Zodrow (2003) and Gugl and Zodrow (forthcoming), as it examines the use of investment 
incentives in the context of differentiating the tax treatment of perfectly mobile and 
imperfectly mobile capital when both types of capital are nominally taxed at the same tax 
rate and international tax competition leads to underprovision of public services financed 
with taxes on mobile capital.  (Although the two types of capital could be defined in any 
reasonable way, one paradigm would be that imperfectly mobile capital includes capital 
already in place in the host country or capital that earns location-specific economic rents, 
while all other capital, including potential new foreign direct investment, is perfectly 
mobile.)    
 In order to focus on this question of the use of tax incentives to provide 
differential tax treatment to perfectly and imperfectly mobile capital, the model abstracts 
from many other important issues.  Most obviously, the analysis focuses solely on the 
perspective of a single country, and does not consider the general equilibrium 
implications that would arise if some or all of world’s economies acted in a similar 
fashion.  For recent discussions of the general equilibrium effects of both tax incentives 
as well as constraints on their use, see Janeba and Peters (1999), Keen (2001) and Janeba 
and Smart (2003).5   Three additional issues are of special importance.  First, the tax 
system is modeled very simply as the tax rate applied to capital income, neglecting all the 
complex issues associated with measuring capital income accurately.  Second, no attempt 
is made to model potentially beneficial aspects of international tax competition, including 
the limitations such competition may place on tendencies toward overprovision of public 
services attributable to Leviathan-type tendencies of national politicians and bureaucrats 
(McLure, 1986; Edwards and Keen, 1996).  Third, it is assumed that tax incentives can be 
                                                 
5   These results are mixed, as Janeba and Peters (1999) conclude that tax coordination in the form of 
eliminating tax preferences for mobile capital are beneficial, Keen (2001) reaches the opposite conclusion, 
and Janeba and Smart (2003) construct a more in general model in which both results can be obtained.  
Note also that these models also generally assume that governments act to maximize revenues, while the 
approach utilized in this paper assumes that the government acts to maximize the welfare of local residents, 
taking into account the potential under-provision of public services attributable to concerns about taxing 
mobile capital. 
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accurately targeted to perfectly mobile capital, reducing its effective tax rate.  Although 
this might be difficult to achieve in practice, there are many examples of attempts to do 
so, including tax preferences, such as rate reductions, tax holidays or investment 
credits/deductions that are available only to certain types of capital (e.g., preferences that 
are “ring-fenced” or not available to domestic taxpayers); such preferences could also be 
approximated with similar provisions designed to favor only assets that are used 
disproportionately by internationally mobile capital.  The model is thus constructed to 
analyze in a fairly stylized way the implications of differentially mobile capital for the 
use of investment incentives when the government is concerned about the underprovision 
of public services associated with financing such services with source-based taxes on 
capital income in the presence of international tax competition for perfectly mobile 
capital. 
 
2. The Model 
The model, which assumes competitive product and factor markets, is constructed 
as follows.  A country is small relative to the international economy and therefore takes 
the rental rate r of perfectly mobile capital K as given.  There is also, however, a second 
type of capital, C, which is less than perfectly mobile over the relevant time horizon, and 
whose inverse supply is given by w(C) with w’>0. The country also has one immobile 
factor, inelastically supplied labor (or the combination of labor and land), L.  Output is 
produced with the two types of capital and labor using a constant returns to scale 
technology and a production function that is strictly concave in both types of capital, 
( )
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Since the production function is homogeneous of degree 1, the marginal products are 
homogenous of degree zero and, due to strict concavity of F( ) in C and K, the 
determinant of the second order derivative matrix of F( ) with respect to C and K is 
strictly positive.6  Thus,  
                                                 
6  For example, the commonly used Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions satisfy these properties.  
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FKCC + FKKK = −FKLL < 0;
FCKK + FCCC = −FCLL < 0;
FCC FKK − FKC 2 > 0.
                                         (1) 
Each unit of output is either used as a unit of a numeraire consumption good (X) 
or is transformed into a unit of a pure public good, denoted as G, that the government 
provides to its residents. The government finances G with taxes on both types of capital 
at a uniform tax rate, t, and head taxes on residents, which in the aggregate are denoted as 
H.  In addition, the government can enact tax incentives for perfectly mobile capital, 
which result in an effective tax rate on perfectly mobile capital of θt, 0<θ<1, with values 
of θ <1 indicating the presence of such incentives.  The government budget constraint is 
thus  
( )KCtHG θ++= .                                                    (2) 
With this tax structure, profit maximization by private firms implies 
.
,
twF
trF
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+=
+= θ
                                                                (3) 
There are n identical residents of the country, each of whom owns the same share of 
perfectly mobile capital, which can be invested anywhere in the world economy 
including the country of residence.  Each resident thus has an exogenous amount of 
income y>0 from ownership of a share of perfectly mobile capital.  To simplify the 
analysis while still allowing for the possibility of expropriating rents from foreign owners 
of imperfectly mobile capital, we assume that such capital is owned entirely by 
foreigners.7  
Each resident’s utility is assumed to depend on the amount of private 
consumption and the consumption of the public good, U(X/n, G), where the utility 
function is well behaved (strictly quasi-concave, continuous and twice differentiable).   
The government is assumed to choose its tax instruments t, H and θ  to maximize the 
aggregate utility of its residents, subject to its balanced budget constraint.  
                                                 
7 This implies the government can ignore the income effects on its residents of taxing imperfectly mobile 
capital. The appendix discusses the derivation of the inverse supply function w(C) and the implications of 
domestic ownership of a share of the imperfectly mobile capital. 
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As in Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), the government recognizes in choosing 
its tax parameters that an increase in the tax on capital will, in equilibrium, cause an 
outflow of both types of capital.  Specifically, differentiating the private firms’ profit 
maximization conditions yields the reactions of the two types of capital K and C to an 
increase in the tax rate t  
dK
dt
= θ FCC − w'( )− FKC
D
< 0,
dC
dt
= FKK −θFKC
D
< 0,
                                    (4) 
where ( ) 2' KCCCKK FwFFD −−=  > 0.  The reaction of the two types of capital to a 
reduction in tax incentives (an increase in θ) is also unambiguously negative 
dK
dθ =
FCC − w'( )t
D
< 0,
dC
dθ =
−FKC t
D
< 0.
                                              (5) 
As expected, a reduction in incentives for perfectly mobile capital drives out perfectly 
mobile capital.  In addition, reducing such incentives also drives out imperfectly mobile 
capital, as the tax-induced reduction in perfectly mobile capital reduces the productivity 
of, and hence demand for, complementary imperfectly mobile capital.    
The government’s optimization problem is thus 
maxt,θ ,H nU
F L,C,K( )− r + tθ( )K − (w + t)C − H
n
+ y,  H + t C + θK( )   
 
  
s.t.  FC = w(C) + t, FK = r + θt  ,
       (6) 
and the first order conditions are 
t : UX − C + θK( )− w'C dCdt
 
  
 
  + nUG C + θK( )+ t
dC
dt
+ tθ dK
dt
 
  
 
  = 0  ;       (7) 
θ : UX −tK − w'C dCdθ
 
  
 
  + nUG tK + t
dC
dθ + tθ
dK
dθ
 
  
 
  = 0 ;                          (8) 
H : −UX + nUG = 0  .                                                                               (9) 
The following sections discuss solutions to various versions of this problem.  We 
consider first the efficient equilibrium, then the situation in which the government can tax 
both types of capital but is constrained to tax them at the same rate t (incentives are 
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precluded), and finally the case in which the government is constrained in its use of head 
taxes but can utilize tax incentives.   
 
The Unconstrained Optimum 
If head taxes can be imposed and tax incentives are available, then the three first 
order conditions are satisfied if t = w’C, θ = 0, and H is set so that the Samuelson 
condition for the efficient provision of public goods nUG/UX = 1 is satisfied. The tax on 
imperfectly mobile capital is imposed following a standard inverse elasticity rule; that is, 
since the elasticity of imperfectly mobile capital is given by ε = w/(w’C), the tax t can be 
written as t = w’C = w/ε.  Thus, the tax on imperfectly mobile capital t will be positive, as 
the government extracts some rents from foreign owners of imperfectly mobile capital, 
balancing this benefit against the cost of lower productivity of the immobile factor due to 
the outflow of imperfectly mobile capital that arises from the imposition of the tax.  On 
the other hand, the standard small open economy result holds for perfectly mobile capital 
– tax incentives should be used to eliminate all taxation of such capital.  This result 
obtains because the price of perfectly mobile capital is fixed internationally so that any 
positive taxation counterproductively reduces the stock of such capital without capturing 
any of its returns, while lowering the productivity of local factors by the full amount of 
both the tax and its excess burden (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1983; Gordon, 1986; Razin 
and Sadka, 1991).   
Note for future reference that  
(C + θK) + (w /ε) dC
dt
> 0,
tK + (w /ε) dC
dθ > 0.
 
since, from (1), 
(C + θK)(FCC FKK − FKC 2) −θw'(FKKK + FKCC) > 0,
K(FCC FKK − FKC 2) − w'(FKKK + FKCC) > 0.
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This implies that an interior solution guarantees that  
( )
.0
,0
>

 ++
>

 +++
θθθ
θθ
d
dC
d
dCttK
dt
dC
dt
dCtKC
                                         (10) 
That is, in equilibrium an increase in the tax on capital or a reduction in tax incentives  
increases capital tax revenues. 
 
Ban on Tax Incentives with Head Taxes Unconstrained 
 Suppose that the government is precluded by law or political considerations from 
using tax incentives for perfectly mobile capital (θ =1); that is, the tax rates on 
imperfectly and perfectly mobile capital are constrained to be the same.  Denote this 
uniform tax rate, which will be termed the benchmark rate, as tB.  Assume that head taxes 
H are still unconstrained.  Evaluating (7-9) at θ =1 implies 
nUG
UX
=1,
tB = (w /ε)
dC
dt
dC
dt
+ dK
dt
< w /ε
0 < tB < w /ε.
                                              (11) 
Thus, the tax rate applied to both types of capital is positive but unambiguously below the 
rate of w/ε that obtains in the unconstrained case, as the government reduces the extent of 
capital taxation because it must be applied to perfectly mobile capital as well as 
imperfectly mobile capital.  However, as long as the government of the small open 
economy is unconstrained in its use of head taxes, there is no underprovision of public 
services.   
Since the results for the unconstrained case established that taxing both types of 
capital at the same rate is not optimal, using incentives is clearly desirable in this case.  
To prove this, note that when the first order condition for t (7) is evaluated at θ =1, the 
first order condition for θ (8) is strictly negative; that is a marginal reduction in θ (the 
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introduction of tax incentives) unambiguously increases the utility of all residents. This 
result obtains if 
1
)/(
0'
=>


 ++
+
<

 

 +++

 +−
X
G
GX
U
nU
d
dK
d
dCttK
d
dCwtK
d
dK
d
dCttKnU
d
dCCwtKU
θθ
θε
θθθ
 
which requires  
θθ
θε
d
dK
d
dC
d
dC
wt
+
> )/( , 
which is satisfied at θ = 1 as long as 
θθ
θ
d
dK
d
dC
d
dC
dt
dK
dt
dC
dt
dC
+
>
+
 . 
Substituting from (4)  and evaluating at θ = 1, this condition is met as long as D>0, which 
is unambiguously true.  Thus, with head taxes unconstrained, the introduction of tax 
incentives from the equilibrium where θ=1 unambiguously increases welfare for 
residents. 
 
Constraint on the Use of Head Taxes, with and without Tax Incentives 
Suppose now that head taxes cannot be imposed at the efficient level and the 
government is instead constrained to H’< H*, where H* denotes the efficient amount of 
head taxes.  As in Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), the constraint on head taxes and the 
resulting use of capital taxation leads to the underprovision of public services as the 
government reduces services because it is concerned about driving out mobile capital.  
Thus, in contrast to the efficient equilibrium, the marginal rate of transformation between 
the private good and the public good is no longer equal to one, and the government can 
no longer simply maximize residents’ income and then choose the level of public goods 
such that the Samuelson efficiency condition holds.  Instead, as soon as the head tax 
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constraint becomes binding and the marginal unit of the public good is financed by 
capital taxation, an increase in the public good of one unit implies a decrease of the 
private good by more than one unit. 
To demonstrate this formally, recall that, given H and θ, (7) specifies the optimal 
tax rate t and (10) implies that an increase in the tax rate increases tax revenues.  If H<H* 
and t were lower than in the unconstrained case, then the equilibrium would have to be 
characterized by underprovision, since both head taxes and property tax revenues would 
be lower than in the efficient equilibrium.  On the other hand, if the tax rate increases, as 
expected, relative to the optimal tax rate in the unconstrained equilibrium, then the 
equilibrium is again characterized by underprovision of public services.  To see this, note 
that (7) can be solved for the marginal rate of substitution between public and private 
goods 
 nUG
UX
=
C + θK( )+ (w /ε) dC
dt
C + θK( )+ t dC
dt
+ θ dK
dt
 
  
 
  
                                             (12) 
and recall that tB , the optimal tax rate with unconstrained H but θ=1, is given by (11).  
Thus, if it is true that t > tB , then 
 t'= βtB = β(w /ε)
dC
dt
dC
dt
+ θ dK
dt
,   β >1 , 
and it must be true that  
 nUG
UX
=
C + θK( )+ (w /ε) dC
dt
C + θK( )+ β(w /ε) dC
dt
>1 ;                                         (13) 
that is, the equilibrium is unambiguously characterized by underprovision of public 
services. 
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 Given underprovision of public services in the presence of the constraint on head 
taxes, (7) implies that the change in residents’ utility with an increase in the tax on capital 
is proportional to 
 UX
nUG
UX
−1   
 
  C + θK( )− (w /ε)
dC
dt
 
  
 
  +
nUG
UX
t dC
dt
+ θ dK
dt
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  .        (14) 
This expression is in general theoretically ambiguous in sign.  The first term is positive 
and indicates that an increase in t increases residents’ welfare because it increases 
revenues and thus mitigates the problem of underprovision of public services.  The 
second term is also positive and reflects the benefit of expropriating rent from foreign 
owners of imperfectly mobile capital (even though some of the benefits of a larger stock 
of perfectly mobile capital are captured by the owners of imperfectly mobile capital, 
which becomes more productive).  However, the third term is negative and captures the 
loss in residents’ welfare due to the tax-induced outflow of both types of capital.  
Similarly, with underprovision, (8) implies that the change in residents’ utility with a 
reduction in tax incentives for mobile capital (an increase in θ) is proportional to 
 UX
nUG
UX
−1   
 
  tK − (w /ε)
dC
dθ
 
  
 
  +
nUG
UX
t dC
dθ + θ
dK
dθ
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  ,                  (15) 
with the interpretations of the three terms analogous to those for an increase in t.  Finally, 
note that (7-8) with a constraint on the use of head taxes can be used to solve for t and θ 
as functions of each other 
 t =
(nUG −UX )(C + θK) −UX (w /ε) dCdt
−nUG dCdt + θ
dK
dt
 
  
 
  
                                        (16) 
 θ =
UX (w /ε) dCdθ − nUGt
dC
dθ − (nUG −UX )tK
nUGt
dK
dθ
 .                             (17) 
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No Tax Incentives.  Suppose initially that no tax incentives for perfectly mobile capital 
are allowed (θ=1).  Then (7) implies 
C + K( )+ (w /ε) dC
dt
C + K( )+ t dC
dt
+ dK
dt
 
  
 
  
= nUG
UX
>1 
which yields 
 t > (w /ε)
dC
dt
dC
dt
+ dK
dt
 
  
 
  
= tB  .                                                         (18) 
Thus, relative to the case in which head taxes are set optimally, the tax rate, applied 
uniformly to both types of capital, must increase.  Indeed, if the constraint is sufficiently 
binding, t may exceed w/ε, the maximum tax rate applied to imperfectly mobile capital in 
the unconstrained equilibrium.     
Nevertheless, the case for introducing tax incentives in this case is theoretically 
ambiguous, even in the complete absence of such incentives (θ=1).  Solving (16) using 
(4) evaluated at θ=1 and recalling that ( ) 2' KCCCKK FwFFD −−= > 0 yields 
 
t = (nUG −UX )(K + C)D −UX (w /ε)(FKK − FKC )−nUG (FCC − w'−2FKC + FKK )  .                      (19) 
At this tax rate, the introduction of incentives is desirable if (8) is negative when 
evaluated at θ = 1, or if 
−UX tK + (w /ε) dCdθ
 
  
 
  + nUG tK + t
dC
dθ +
dK
dθ
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  < 0 .                 (20) 
Substituting from (5) yields 
−UX KD − w'CFKC( )+ nUG KD + t FCC − w'−FKC( )( )< 0 
which implies 
t > nUG −UX( )KD + UX w'CFKC−nUG FCC − w'−FKC( )  .                                               (21) 
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Substituting from (19), this condition becomes 
−UX KD − w'CFKC( )+ nUG KD + t(FCC − w'−FKC )( )< 0
nUG −UX( ) K + C( )D −UX (w /ε) FKK − FKC( )
−nUG FCC − w'−2FKC + FKK( ) >
nUG −UX( )KD + UX (w /ε)FKC
−nUG FCC − w'−FKC( )
 
Simplifying yields 
( )( )KFCFCwKFCFUnUCwU KKKCKCCCXGX −−−+−> ''  . 
Thus, when θ =1, introducing tax incentives for perfectly mobile capital will be desirable 
if 
nUG (w /ε) > nUG −UX( ) −(FKKK + FKCC) + (FCCC + FCKK)[ ] 
or, using (1), when 
(nUG /UX )(w /ε) > nUG /UX −1( ) L(FKL − FCL )[ ] .                            (22) 
This condition holds unambiguously when FCL > FKL, that is, when imperfectly mobile 
capital is more complementary with the untaxed factor, labor, since the right side of the 
expression is negative, while the left side is positive.  In this case, optimal tax 
considerations in the presence of heterogeneous capital (independent of supply 
elasticities) do not prescribe uniform taxation and instead call for differentially higher 
taxation of imperfectly mobile capital (Auerbach, 1979), which is achieved with the 
introduction of tax incentives for perfectly mobile capital.  Note that this effect is 
amplified if underprovision of public services due to international tax competition is 
relatively severe, that is, if nUG/UX  is large relative to one.  In addition, incentives are 
relatively more desirable if ε is small, as a relatively inelastic supply of imperfectly 
mobile capital implies that differentially high taxation of such capital is especially 
desirable in order to capture the rents enjoyed by foreign capital owners.  This factor is 
also amplified if underprovision of public services due to international tax competition is 
relatively important.   (If tax-induced underprovision of public goods attributable did not 
arise (nUG = UX ), this effect would be the only relevant one, and tax incentives for 
perfectly mobile capital would unambiguously be desirable.) 
 On the other hand, if FCL < FKL, then optimal tax considerations in the presence of 
heterogeneous capital call for differentially higher taxation of perfectly mobile capital.  If 
this factor is sufficiently important, incentives for perfectly mobile capital can be 
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undesirable even at θ =1, since they create a tax differential in the “wrong direction” 
from an optimal heterogeneous capital taxation standpoint, even though such incentives 
will be desirable to tax imperfectly mobile capital at a relatively higher rate.  Indeed, it is 
theoretically possible that differentially higher taxation of perfectly mobile capital (which 
has been precluded by assumption since θ<1) is desirable in this case. 
 More generally, as noted in the introduction, the case for incentives may be 
tempered by concerns regarding resource misallocations attributable to advantageous tax 
treatment of specific types of capital.  Any such inefficiencies must be weighed against 
the benefits of lowering the taxation of perfectly mobile capital and reducing the 
underprovision of public services attributable to the taxation of mobile capital. 
Full Tax Incentives.  Although the case for tax incentives is theoretically ambiguous, it is 
possible to show that, in contrast to the case with unconstrained head taxation, full use of 
tax incentives to completely relieve the tax burden on perfectly mobile capital (θ=0) is 
never optimal if the government cannot impose head taxes in the efficient amount.  
Substituting into (7) at θ=0 and using (4) yields  
t = (nUG −UX )CD + UX (w /ε)FKK−nUGFKK .                                                (23) 
From (8), reducing tax incentives (increasing θ from  θ=0) is desirable if 
 t < nUG −UX( )KD −UX w'CFKC
nUGFKC
 .                                                  (24) 
Substituting from (23) and using (1) implies that this condition is satisfied if 
 
nUG −UX( ) C + θK( )D −UX w'C FKK −θFKC( )
−nUG θ 2 FCC − w'( )− 2θFKC + FKK( ) <
nUG −UX( )KD + UX w'CFKC
−nUG θ FCC − w'( )− FKC( )
nUG −UX( )CD −UX w'CFKK
−nUGFKK
< nUG −UX( )KD + UX w'CFKC
nUGFKC
nUG −UX( )D FKCC + FKKK( )< 0
 
 nUG −UX( )D FKLL( )> 0,                                                                 (25) 
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which is always satisfied since FKL>0.  Thus, if head taxes are not available in the 
efficient amount, the second-best optimum requires a strictly positive θ  – that is, less tax 
incentives than in the first best optimum.  The intuition behind this result is an extension 
of the results regarding the optimal taxation of heterogeneous capital noted above.  
Specifically, if head taxes are constrained and taxes on labor are not used, the public 
good will be partially financed with distortionary taxes on the two factors that are 
complementary to labor, including both perfectly mobile as well as imperfectly mobile 
capital.   Of course, as noted above, uniform taxation of the two types of capital will not 
be desirable unless they are equally complementary to labor. 
 These results are sufficiently ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint that some 
simple simulations of the model may be illustrative in determining the extent to which tax 
incentives in the presence of international tax competition are desirable in the model.  
Several such simulations are provided in the following section. 
 
3. Some Simple Simulation Results 
As an illustration of the nature of the interaction between the tax rate on capital 
and investment tax incentives, consider the following example.  Suppose the production 
function is Cobb-Douglas and is given by βα KACF = , where A = 10, α = .25, β = .426.  
Suppose the supply curve for imperfectly mobile capital is linear w(C) = γC with γ = .1, 
which implies that the supply elasticity is unitary (ε=1).  The return on capital is set as r = 
1, the capital owned by residents is 34.09 and the number of residents is 100.8 The utility 
function of residents is given by 25.75. GXU = , where X denotes the amount of private 
good and G the amount of public good consumed by the representative resident.  Given 
these parameter values, the price of imperfectly mobile capital in the country if head 
taxes and tax incentives are set optimally is also equal to one. 
Table 1 reports the equilibrium values for perfectly mobile capital (K), 
imperfectly mobile capital (C), the tax rate on capital (t/(w+t)), the tax incentives for 
perfectly mobile capital (θ), head taxes (H), the amount of public goods (G) and the 
                                                 
8 We have chosen the capital share of the country to be the same as the amount of 
perfectly mobile capital in the country if tax incentives and head taxes can be used. 
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aggregate amount of private goods (X), as well as “Loss,” the amount of private good that 
would be required to compensate the residents for the decrease in the public good as a 
percentage of X+G (the total amount of goods and  public services consumed by the 
residents).  The last column shows the sum of the marginal rates of substitution of the 
residents (nUG/UX) which equals one in an efficient equilibrium. 
TABLE 1:  SOME SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
The first row of results in this table indicates that when head taxes are 
unconstrained the optimal tax rate on imperfectly mobile capital, expressed as a 
percentage of the total price of imperfectly mobile capital, is 50%.  We first compare two 
cases in which head taxes are set optimally – in the first case, the country can enact tax 
incentives while in the second case the government has to tax both types of capital 
uniformly.  Since the government has more choice in the first case than in the latter case, 
it is not surprising that the residents are better off with tax incentives than without them, 
especially since the model requires full tax incentives in the first best optimum.  Note that 
the amount of head taxes is higher if θ =1 than when θ =0, while the amount of public 
good is higher with θ =0 than with θ =1.  The interpretation of this result is that if the 
country has to tax both types of capital uniformly, it will always lose mobile capital and 
will therefore set a tax rate that is below the tax rate t=w/ε.  On the other hand, if 
incentives are available so that the government can tax imperfectly mobile capital only, it 
can maximize the income of residents.  Since both X and G are normal goods, as income 
goes down, less of both goods will be consumed.  Taxing both types of capital at the 
 K C t/(w+t) (%) θ H G X Loss ΣMRS
H unconstrained 34.090 10.000 50.000 0.000 7.500 17.500 0.525 0.000 1.000
H unconstrained, θ =1 25.566 12.497 16.510 1.000 7.526 16.933 0.508 3.369 1.000
H constrained, θ =1 25.541 12.491 16.545 1.000 7.500 16.918 0.508 3.370 1.001
H constrained, θ =1 25.095 12.380 17.218 1.000 7.000 16.649 0.511 3.397 1.023
H constrained, θ =1 24.656 12.269 17.897 1.000 6.500 16.376 0.513 3.441 1.045
H constrained 33.565 9.923 50.346 0.007 7.000 17.216 0.528 0.008 1.022
H constrained 33.045 9.846 50.692 0.014 6.500 16.931 0.531 0.032 1.045
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same rate has a negative income effect.  On the other hand there will also be a 
substitution effect between the tax instruments, because the tax structure that maximizes 
residents’ income can no longer be imposed (i.e. t = w/ε, θ = 0).  As perfectly mobile 
capital is taxed and therefore is driven out of the country, the productivity of the fixed 
factor decreases, while by taxing imperfectly mobile capital the productivity of labor also 
decreases but at the same time the price paid to owners of imperfectly mobile capital 
decreases as well.  On the other hand, using head taxes does not change the income of 
residents.  This makes the use of head taxes even more attractive than in the case where 
θ =0.  If on the other hand, the country relied only on head taxes, the utility of residents 
would be lower and so is the amount of private consumption (49.1 as opposed to 50.8). 
Thus, the country increases the amount of head taxes if θ = 1 compared to θ = 0, but at 
the same time it uses some capital taxation, because capital taxation still incorporates the 
benefit of expropriating rents from foreign capital owners.   
Once head taxes are constrained, underprovision of public goods results.  
However, while the amount of public good goes down, the revenues raised from taxing 
both types of capital go up.   
Next, compare row 2 to rows 3, 4 and 5.  In all of these cases, the country needs 
to impose a uniform tax rate on both types of capital, but in rows 3-5, the country is 
constrained in its use of head taxes.  As expected, the country increases the tax rate to 
compensate for the loss in revenue from head taxes, but any increase in the capital tax 
rate decreases the amount of both types of capital in the jurisdiction and results in 
underprovision of public services.   
Underprovision also occurs when the country is constrained in its use of head 
taxes but can enact tax incentives.  If head taxes are constrained but can still finance a 
large portion of the public good, tax incentives help mitigate the negative effect of taxing 
perfectly mobile capital and the underprovision is less pronounced than in the case of 
uniform taxation of both types of capital.  Once head taxes are constrained, the tax rate 
rises modestly, but the optimal amount of incentives is very close to full incentives 
(θ =0).  Recall from the previous section that the complementarity of the two factors with 
respect to labor was one of the determining factors for the size of the tax incentive.  In the 
table below we report the values of ( ).CLKL FF θ−  
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 FCL FKL FKL-θ *FCL 
H unconstrained 0.648 0.324 0.324 
H constrained 0.647 0.326 0.322 
H constrained 0.647 0.328 0.319 
H unconstrained, θ =1  0.485 0.404 -0.081 
H constrained, θ =1 0.485 0.404 -0.081 
H constrained, θ =1 0.484 0.407 -0.077 
H constrained, θ =1 0.484 0.411 -0.073 
 
The last four values of ( )CLKL FF θ−  indicate that θ =1 is not optimal and that a 
decrease in θ  (increase in tax incentives) would be beneficial.  If θ  is set optimally, 
( )CLKL FF θ− >0, as indicated in the first three reported values, since 
( ) ( ) θθ CwnUFFLUnU GCLKLXG '=−−  describes the optimal solution for θ  and the right 
hand side of this equation is unambiguously positive for θ> 0.  Note also that while tax 
incentives in this example should be substantial, they decrease as the country faces a 
more severe restriction on head taxes; indeed, tax incentives decrease much more as a 
percentage of the previous value than the capital tax rate increases.  This is consistent 
with the result that jurisdictions will be less generous with tax incentives as 
underprovision is more severe. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 This paper has examined the case for investment tax incentives from the 
perspective of a developing country in the context of differentiating the tax treatment of 
perfectly mobile and imperfectly mobile capital when both types of capital are nominally 
taxed at the same tax rate and international tax competition leads to underprovision of 
public services financed with taxes on mobile capital.  The results of the model utilized in 
the paper are clear cut when head taxes are available  and unconstrained,  as head taxes 
are used to ensure efficient provision of public services and the tax rate on imperfectly 
mobile capital is set following an inverse elasticity rule while incentives are used to 
eliminate the tax burden on perfectly mobile capital.  Once head taxes are constrained 
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and capital taxes are used to replace the lost revenues,  underprovision of public services 
results.  Under these circumstances, the case for using investment tax incentives is no 
longer theoretically unambiguous since, following the literature on the optimal taxation 
of heterogeneous capital, the efficient tax structure depends on the complementarity of 
perfectly and imperfectly mobile capital with labor, and tax incentives may move the tax 
system toward greater inefficiency in the taxation of the two types of capital.  
Nevertheless, some simulations of the model suggest that investment tax incentives can 
be quite beneficial in reducing the inefficiency attributable to underprovision of public 
services in the presence of international tax competition, although these results are still 
tentative. 
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Appendix 
This appendix investigates the implications of domestic ownership of a fraction of 
imperfectly mobile capital amd discusses the supply function for imperfectly mobile 
capital. Suppose that a fraction µ of C*, the amount of imperfectly mobile capital initially 
in the initial equilibrium, is owned by residents.  (The income from any ownership of 
imperfectly mobile capital in other countries is assumed to be unaffected by any changes 
in domestic tax policy and is included in y.)  In this case, tax changes will affect the 
country’s residents through income effects related to their ownership of imperfectly 
mobile capital.  Suppose further that there are M owners of imperfectly mobile capital in 
the country (that is, there are n owners who are residents and M-n foreign owners) and 
every owner has an equal share.  Suppose that in response to a tax increase, a firm in the 
country decides to move capital abroad.  By withdrawing capital from the taxing country 
and transferring it to a different country, this firm incurs adjustment costs given by the 
strictly convex function φ(C*-C); that is, investment is assumed to be characterized by 
increasing marginal adjustment costs.  The firm then sells the capital for W per unit on 
the world market.  In order to get capital from the investors, the firm must offer the 
investors in the country at least w.  The firm’s optimization problem then becomes  
( )( ) ( )CCCCwWC −−−− **max φ  
where C denotes the amount of capital the firm chooses to leave in the country after the 
price for capital goes down in the home country compared to the world price of this 
capital, W.  The first order condition is given by  
( ) 0' * =−+− CCWw φ  
or φ’= W-w, that is, the tax increase causes emigration of capital until the marginal 
adjustment cost equals the increase in the rate of return that can be obtained by moving 
imperfectly mobile capital abroad.  The inverse supply of imperfectly mobile capital is 
thus given explicitly by  
( ) ( )CCWCw −−= *'φ  
and, with convex adjustment costs, w’(C)= φ”>0 as assumed above.   
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 In this case, the country’s optimization problem (6) becomes 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ).*',)(..
,
***)(,,
max ,,
CCWwandtrFtCwFts
KCtH
y
n
M
CCCCwWwCHCtwKtrKCLF
nU
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Ht
−−=+=+=

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
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


++
+
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φθ
θ
φµθ
θ
 
and the first order conditions are 
 
t : UX − C + θK( )− 1− µ( )w'C dCdt
 
  
 
  + nUG C + θK( )+ t
dC
dt
+ tθ dK
dt
 
  
 
  = 0;
θ : UX −tK − 1− µ( )w'C dCdθ
 
  
 
  + nUG tK + t
dC
dθ + tθ
dK
dθ
 
  
 
  = 0;
H : −UX + nUG = 0.  
 If the government is unconstrained in its use of head taxes, t = (1 - µ)w’C or t = (1 
- µ)w/ε; θ = 0, and nUG/UX = 1.  Thus, as more of the imperfectly mobile capital is owned 
domestically, the tax on imperfectly mobile capital decreases.   
 If the government is constrained in its use of head taxes, then for any value of θ 
the optimal t is given  by 
 
( )( ) ( )


 +−
−−+−
=
dt
dK
dt
dCnU
dt
dCCwUKCUnU
t
G
XXG
θ
µθ '1
. 
In this case, the condition under which tax incentives are desirable (a decrease of θ from 
θ = 1) is given by 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) CwUnUFFLUnU
FwFnU
CFwUKDUnU
FFwFnU
FFCwUDKCUnU
XGKLCLXG
KCCCG
KCXXG
KKKCCCG
KCKKXXG
'
'
'1
2'
'1
µ
µθµ
+−>−−
−−−
−+−>+−−−
−−−+−
 
In the extreme case in which all imperfectly mobile capital is owned domestically, we 
obtain the condition 
 ( )./ CLKL FFLw −>ε  
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That is, to a greater extent than in the case of foreign ownership, the use of tax incentives 
will depend on optimal taxation conditions in the presence of heterogeneous capital. It is 
straightforward to show that full incentives are still never optimal in this case. 
